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drawn from maintenance and cure cases or upon some independent
theory such as foreseeability. In Murphey's use of Aguilar and
Waterman in a non-admiralty context to find sufficient employer
benefit, the court noted that the activity occurring during the "free
time" was specifically authorized. Williams showed that specific
authorization for the activity was essential to the holding. This
authorization is not present in Mauk.34
The denial of the defendant-team's motion for summary judg-
ment in Mauk permits a jury to find that the mere granting of "free
time" by the team brings the defendant-player within the scope of
his employment. As has been shown, such a conclusion based on the
authorities cited may be inappropriate. Though the Mauk court
found the relationship between the player and the team to be unique
and without parallel,35 this holding can be logically extended beyond
the isolated employment situation. The benefit that accrues to the
professional football team by granting time away from the training
camp is no greater than the benefit to a more conventional employer
in a highly competitive business who grants "free time" to his em-
ployees. It can be reasonably argued that equal employer benefits
result and that the holding in Mauk can be extended beyond the
isolated employment situation.
Fred R. Brown
SECURITIES- SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-SECTION
10(b)-SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION RULE 10b-5
-BIRNBAUM RULE-The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has disavowed the purchaser-seller limitation
known as the Birnbaum rule and has held that any person may seek
private relief under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, if he has, in his
capacity as an investor, suffered significant injury as a direct conse-
quence of a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.
34. The authorization in Williams and Mauk consisted solely of being given time-off away
from the job. The specific authorization in Murphey which was absent in Williams and Mauk
was more than the mere granting of "free time" by the employer. Rather, it was the authority
to use the Army vehicle, which was involved in the accident, to find recreation in the nearby
town.
35. 367 F. Supp. at 971.
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Recent Decisions
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 490 F.2d 654
(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
The plaintiffs are shareholders of Bank Service Corporation
[Bank Service]. The defendants are an automobile sales corpora-
tion known as Dave Waite Pontiac, Inc. [Waite] and General Mo-
tors Acceptance Corporation [GMAC]. GMAC financed Waite's
purchases of automobiles for a leasing business Waite owned prior
to the transaction in dispute; Bank Service contracted to purchase
the automobile leasing business from Waite. Under the agreement,
Bank Service exchanged 7000 of its shares for the transfer to it of
Waite's leasing business. Bank Service was obligated under the
agreement to assume the liabilities of the leasing business, includ-
ing notes payable to GMAC. The individual plaintiffs guaranteed
those notes, as well as future liabilities, to GMAC. The leasing
business subsequently failed; Bank Service became insolvent and
defaulted on the notes; GMAC filed suit in state court against the
plaintiffs as guarantors. The plaintiffs filed a claim in federal court
for recision of the guarantees under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,' and under Securities and Exchange Com-
mission rule 10b-5,1 alleging fraud on the part of GMAC and Waite.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana dismissed the plaintiffs' third amended complaint and de-
nied them leave to file a fourth, because the plaintiffs were neither
purchasers nor sellers of the securities involved in the transaction.3
The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, urging that their
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Section 10(b) of the Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the
purchase and sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
3. The dismissal of Eason v. GMAC by the federal district court is not a reported case.
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complaint stated a proper claim under rule 10b-5. They argued for
recovery on four alternative grounds: that the delivery to GMAC of
their personal guarantees was a sale of "securities"; that the notes
underlying the guarantees were securities which they were being
forced to "purchase"; that, as shareholders of the corporation which
sold its shares in return for the leasing business, they were indirect
"sellers" of 7000 shares of corporate stock; and that the "purchaser-
seller" rule of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.4 should be rejected
in the Seventh Circuit. The court recognized that entertaining the
plaintiffs' claim on any but the last ground would require stretching
the meaning of "securities," "purchasers," and "sellers." The court
preferred to examine the viability of the Birnbaum rule, rather than
stretch the meaning of those words.
The court noted that the plaintiffs had properly alleged a viola-
tion of rule 10b-5. Material misstatements and omissions were alleg-
edly made by GMAC and Waite, the 7000 shares of Bank Service
stock were securities, and their issuance and delivery amounted to
a sale.' The alleged fraud was "in connection with" the sale of the
securities, though the fraud related to the value of the assets ac-
quired by Bank Service, rather than to the value of the securities
delivered to Waite.' Thus the issue was whether the plaintiffs might
assert a private claim for relief under rule 10b-5 despite their non-
purchaser-seller status. The court rejected the rule of Birnbaum
which requires the plaintiffs to be purchasers or sellers in order to
seek relief under rule 10b-5. It viewed the class of persons protected
by rule 10b-5 as broader than purchasers and sellers, and concluded
4. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). In Birnbaum, the plaintiffs
sought relief for injury suffered as a result of a fraudulent sale of corporate stock by a
corporate fiduciary and controlling shareholder. The alleged fraud was the fiduciary's sending
of a letter to the rest of the shareholders, designed to discourage their approval of a merger
advantageous to them. This was done to further the fiduciary's plan to sell his control block
of shares to another corporation at a substantial premium, thereby causing Newport to
become a captive subsidiary. In dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint, Judge Hand established
two principles of law with regard to rule lOb-5 suits: that section 10(b) "was directed solely
at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs"; and
further that "Rule X-10b-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller."
193 F.2d at 464. It was the latter principle which the plaintiffs urged the Eason court to reject.
5. 490 F.2d at 656, citing Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 27 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
6. 490 F.2d at 656, citing Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201-03 (5th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
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that "investors" are within the class protected by the rule.' The
court held that any person may seek private redress of injuries
where, as an investor, he has been significantly harmed as a direct
consequence of a fraud "in connection with" the purchase or sale of
securities. The court added that the investor must have participated
in the transaction, but not necessarily as a purchaser or seller.
The plaintiffs were entitled to seek rule 10b-5 relief under the
court's new approach. As substantial shareholders, they were in-
duced to personally guarantee the liabilities assumed by Bank Ser-
vice when it purchased the leasing business. Their shareholdings in
Bank Service gave them "investor" status. Their direct participa-
tion, as individual guarantors in the purchase of the business,
brought them close enough to the transaction to satisfy the require-
ment that they be injured as a direct consequence of the fraud.
Since 1952, when Judge Hand decided the Birnbaum case, the
"purchaser-seller" limitation has undergone substantial erosion.
Successful efforts have been made by litigants who sought to enlarge
the class of persons entitled to private relief under rule 10b- 51 by
stretching the traditional meaning of the words "purchaser" and
"seller." A corporation which, as a consequence of fraud, issued its
own shares in return for worthless assets was a "seller" within the
meaning of the rule? A merging corporation which issued its own
shares in exchange for shares of the merged corporation was both a
"seller" and a "purchaser" of securities. 0 A minority shareholder of
a corporation which merged with another corporation through a
short form merger was held to be a "seller," even though he still held
his shares on completion of the merger. The merger put the share-
holder in the position of a "forced seller" who had no choice but to
sell at the price fixed by the merger, or seek an appraisal." A stock
broker who claimed that his customer fraudulently breached his
agreement to purchase securities was afforded seller status, even
7. The Eason court drew support for its use of the word "investors" from Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). According to the Eason court, the
Supreme Court in Bankers Life placed emphasis on the petitioner's status as an "investor."
8. The implied civil remedy under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 was first recognized by
Judge Kirkpatrick in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
9. Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961). See also Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
10. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, Bard v. Dasho,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
11. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
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though he never completed the sale.'2 A person who was induced not
to purchase securities as a result of fraud was entitled to assert a
claim for private relief.'3 Thus, on a case by case basis, the circuits
have avoided the narrow application of the "purchaser-seller" limi-
tation conceived by the Birnbaum decision.
In the midst of the evident erosion that has to some extent emas-
culated the Birnbaum rule, courts have continued to proclaim its
vitality," at least with respect to actions for damages.'5 The reluct-
ance of courts to abandon the "purchaser-seller" limitation has
some of its roots in the fear that litigation, currently abundant
under section 10(b), would become unmanageable without the
rule." Some reluctance to abandon the limitation may also be ex-
plained by the fact that limiting relief to "purchasers" and "sellers"
makes simpler the difficult problem of ascertaining a causal connec-
tion between the claimant's injury and the alleged fraud. 7
12. A.I. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
13. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip 'Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973).
14. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969). See also
Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970) where it was said that Birnbaum still
stands, despite the criticism it has received and the erosion that has in many cases occurred.
15. In Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), a non-purchaser
plaintiff's claim for damages under rule 10b-5 was denied, but the court held that injunctive
relief against further stock manipulation would be allowed. The court stated that the claim
for damages foundered both on proof of loss and causal connection with the alleged violation
of the rule, but a claim for injunctive relief avoids those issues and may cure the harm suffered
by remaining shareholders. See also Kahan v. Rosentiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 950 (1970).
16. See, e.g., Judge Hufstedler's dissent in Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492
F.2d 136, 146 (9th Cir. 1973).
17. The "purchaser-seller" limitation of Birnbaum was announced in a case where the
facts presented no apparent causal connection. Courts have indicated recently, however, that
to the extent a causal connection between a claimant's injury and the alleged fraud appears
clear, the basis for adherence to the "purchaser-seller" limitation becomes weakened. This
viewpoint has recently been expressed by the Second Circuit, which decided Birnbaum, in
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969). As Crane qualified as
a "seller" under the "forced seller" concept enunciated in Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), a showing of a causal connection was not a problem. The court stated,
however, by way of dictum:
Although this court adhered to a fairly strict construction of the purchaser-seller
requirement in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel . . . , and in Iroquois Industries, Inc. v.
Syracuse China Corp .... there was in Birnbaum no indication of a causal connec-
tion between the alleged violation of Rule lOb-5 and the injury to the corporation and
its shareholders.
419 F.2d at 797. See also Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970), where the court
stated:
The hesitancy of courts to grant a cause of action under Rule lob-5 when the causal
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The Eason decision is the first decision by a circuit court ex-
pressly disavowing the "purchaser-seller" limitation with respect to
actions for damages." In doing so, the court has not frustrated the
need for a rule that fulfills the functions of the Birnbaum rule-to
simplify the problem of making a clear showing of causal connection
between the fraud and the injury and to restrain the amount of
federal court litigation under section 10(b). Behind the court's rejec-
tion of the Birnbaum limitation was a desire to adopt a rule flexible
enough to effectuate the broad purposes of the Act without requiring
a perversion of its meaning in order to accomplish those purposes. 9
The erosion of the "purchaser-seller" limitation evidenced a de-
mand for protection of a broader class of persons, a demand which
the court met by opening its doors to any "investor" significantly
harmed by fraud in his capacity as an "investor." While the court
has recognized a larger class of persons entitled to sue under rule
10b-5, its decision has not made more difficult the finding of the
required causal connection nor exposed the courts to excessive liti-
gation. The claimant must have been injured as a direct conse-
quence of a fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction. 0
Under the court's holding, only those "investors" who can show a
causal connection between the alleged fraud and the injury may
assert a rule 10b-5 claim. To establish this critical element of direct
causation, the court indicated that the claimant must have been a
party to the allegedly tainted transaction-he must have partici-
pated in it, though not necessarily as a "purchaser" or "seller." The
requirement of showing direct causation and participation in the
transaction will continue to place a firm limitation on the class of
persons entitled to assert a rule 10b-5 damages claim. For example,
a shareholder who complains that his corporation has been de-
frauded in connection with a securities transaction could not, with-
connection between the fraud and the injury is not readily apparent, as when there is
no direct dealing between the parties, may explain in part, at least, the diverse results.
Id. at 881.
18. In Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973), it was held that a causal-
connection test, rather than a "purchaser-seller" test, would be adopted for suits seeking
equitable relief. In Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973), Vincent was
construed to apply as well to suits for damages.
19, See 490 F.2d at 659. The Eason court noted that it was inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's position that the language of rule lOb-5 be broadly construed to allow relief only to
those claimants who are purchasers or sellers. The court felt, however, that construing the
limitation broadly while paying homage to Birnbaum provides for a rule of little integrity.
20. Id. at 659.
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out showing that he participated in the transaction, seek damages
for any consequent loss to him. His inability to establish that his
injury resulted as a direct consequence of the fraud would be fatal
to his cause of action. Thus, the court was probably correct when it
speculated that its approach may work to control the class of per-
sons entitled to seek relief under rule 10b-5 as effectively as does a
broad application of the "purchaser-seller" limitation.'
Whether the other circuits will follow the Seventh Circuit's lead
and disavow the Birnbaum rule is difficult to predict. Because they
have learned to live with the rule, and because the long line of
decisions provide some guide to its application, the courts may ad-
here to it. As the Eason court pointed out, however, the Birnbaum
rule has not been uniformly applied." As the circuits' application
of the "purchaser-seller" limitation has demonstrated, courts have
viewed the rule as too narrow to effectuate the purposes of the Act
of 1934. The Eason court's decision, broadening the class of persons
protected by rule 10b-5 while at the same time imposing the burden
of direct causation on the claimant, would seem to provide a quality
which the Birnbaum rule has lacked: It gives courts greater flexibil-
ity to entertain the rule 10b-5 suits which they deem appropriate,
without substantially increasing the current level of litigation under
the Act. Whether the other circuits follow Eason may turn on how
well the new approach works in practice.
If the other circuits decide to reject the "purchaser-seller" limita-
tion, they must do so without encouragement from the Supreme
Court. Although Eason relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.2" as
support for expanding the class of persons protected by rule 10b-5,
such reliance was misplaced. The court seized upon language in
Bankers Life which placed emphasis on the injured claimant's
21. Id. at 660. The court stated the availability of private relief under rule 10b-5 would
still be limited by the requirement that the claimant be a member of the "special class"
protected by the rule and that he be able to show causation between the injury and the fraud.
22. Id. at 661.
23. 404 U.S. 6 (1970). Bankers Life was the sole shareholder of Manhattan Casualty. All
of Manhattan's stock was sold to a party who paid for the shares with an uncovered $5,000,000
check drawn on Irving Trust. On the day of the purchase of Manhattan's stock, the new
owners sold all of Manhattan's assets, U.S. Treasury bonds, in order to cover the Irving Trust
check. When it was discovered that Manhattan was rendered insolvent, the petitioner
brought a rule 10b-5 action based on several alternative transactions. One was the sale of the




"investor" status. 4 Although it was largely on the basis of that
language that the court designated "investors" as the class pro-
tected by its new approach, it is not clear that Bankers Life supports
a disavowal of the Birnbaum limitation. A close reading of the entire
opinion in Bankers Life suggests that the Supreme Court did not
recommend the slightest abandonment of the "purchaser-seller"
rule. The petitioner in that case, representing Manhattan Casualty,
grounded his single claim for recovery on three alternative transac-
tions, 5 two of which become important in light of the Court's deci-
sion. In one transaction, Manhattan allegedly suffered harm as a
result of the sale of Manhattan's stock by Bankers Life and Cas-
ualty. Manhattan was neither a "purchaser" nor a "seller" with
respect to this transaction. In order to entertain the petitioner's
claim for relief based on this transaction, the Court would have had
to pass on the "purchaser-seller" rule. But the petitioner also based
his claim on the transaction involving the sale by Manhattan of its
treasury bonds. It was with respect to this transaction, in which
Manhattan was clearly a "seller," that the Court ruled that a re-
dressable claim had been alleged under section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5.
It is significant that the Court chose to proceed solely on that
claim of petitioner in which Manhattan was a "seller" of securities.
Its refusal to rule on the "purchaser-seller" limitation may indicate
either a preference to leave the question of Birnbaum's viability to
the circuits or a tacit approval of the rule. The latter reading of the
case is suggested by language of the Court which stressed Manhat-
tan's status as a "seller."2 At a minimum, Bankers Life left the
Birnbaum limitation firmly intact."
24. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said that the essential element of the case
was that "Manhattan suffered injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of
securities as an investor." Id. at 12-13. Justice Douglas also stated that Manhattan "was
injured as an investor through a deceptive device ..... Id. at 10.
25. Id. at 13 n.10.
26. "The Act protects corporations as well as individuals who are sellers of a security."
Id. at 10 (emphasis added). "The crux of the present case is that Manhattan suffered an
injury as a result of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." Id. at
12-13 (emphasis added).
27. Professor Leech said recently, speaking of the effect of Bankers Life on the "purchaser-
seller" rule:
But I do not think that Bankers Life even tangentially resolved the issue. In short, if
the lower courts throw Birnbaum out, it will not be because the Supreme Court has
told them to.
PLI, FOURTH ANNUAL INsTITUTE ON SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 378, 379 (1973).
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Though Bankers Life is doubtful support for expanding rule 10b-
5 protection beyond the Birnbaum "purchaser-seller" limitation,
there is no Supreme Court decision which can be construed as a
mandate to keep it. The Eason court's new approach seems to be a
positive step toward adopting a more workable test than the narrow
"purchaser-seller" rule-a causal connection test, requiring that the
investor be injured as a direct consequence of a fraudulent securities
transaction. To assure that causation is direct rather than remote,
the investor must have participated in the transaction that alleg-
edly harmed him. Thus, by placing on the claimant the burden of
proof of direct causation, a court can maintain some control over the
amount of federal securities litigation, while allowing it to more
fully embrace the broad purposes of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.25
While the Seventh Circuit has left unanswered the precise definition
of "investors," it has made a constructive effort toward curing the
defects that were inherent in the "purchaser-seller" limitation.
Dennis K. Larry
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-NARCOTIC ADDICT REHA-
BILITATION ACT-The United States Supreme Court has held that a
provision of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, which excludes
narcotic addicts with two or more prior felony convictions from
consideration for civil commitment in lieu of penal incarceration,
does not violate the equal protection requirement of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment.
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974).
Robert Edward Marshall was sentenced to ten years in prison
28. As noted earlier, the Birnbaum decision stands, aside from the "purchaser-seller"
rule, for the proposition that section 10(b) was not directed at fraudulent mismanagement of
corporate affairs, but at the type of fraud usually associated with the purchase or sale of
securities. Supra note 4. The Bankers Life decision largely rejected the Birnbaum proposi-
tion. It stated that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are not limited to protecting the integrity
of the securities markets, and that there is a federally enforceable claim by the purchaser
or seller for fraudulent mismanagement in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.
But Birnbaum still has vitality to the extent that transactions which constitute no more
than fraudulent mismanagement, unconnected with a purchase or sale of securities, are
still not actionable under section 10(b). In such cases the claimant must seek his remedy in
state court.
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